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CHILEAN OVERTURES TO NAFTA 
Adam Marks 
Introduction 
In the past ten years, the Republic of Chile 
has gone from a small, relatively closed econo-
my ruled under a dictatorship to a democratic 
government with a thriving economy and a 
large international focus. Reforms to open the 
economy at the end of the dictatorship, during 
the mid-to-late 'eighties, started Chile on a path 
to economic success. However, it wasn't until 
the 1990s, after a democratic government took 
office, that these reforms were implemented 
with their greatest potential. Chile started to 
negotiate bilateral and multilateral free-trade 
agreements with countries and trading blocs all 
across the globe, resulting in increased oppor-
tunities for trade and increased diversification. 
As a sign of the progress that Chile had made 
during the previous decade, President Clinton 
in 1994 extended an invitation for Chile to 
become the fourth member of the North 
American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA). If 
Chile were to join NAFTA, what effect would that 
have on the Chilean economy? 
In this paper I review Chile's historical 
journey, starting in the mid-twentieth century, 
and track the country's "progress" in interna-
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tiona! trade up until the present day. I exam-
ine the steps that Chile has taken to expand its 
global economy through the many free-trade 
agreements that it has negotiated. In addition, 
I explore the potential effects, both positive and 
negative, that Chile's entry into NAFTA would 
have. Finally, I explore the feasibility of Chile's 
admission into NAFTA and examine what 
options or opportunities Chile has in the future. 
History of Chilean Trade 
To understand the role of international 
trade within Chile, it is necessary to understand 
the direction that it has been heading during 
the last few decades. From the 1930s to the 
1960s, Chile followed a strategy of import-sub-
stitution-industrialization, creating an import-
competing sector that was protected from for-
eign competition. In order to achieve this goal, 
Chile relied on various instruments such as tar-
iffs, import and export quotas, and import per-
mits. In fact, by 1973 the average tariff rate on 
imports was 105 percent, with tariffs ranging 
from 0 percent for essential consumer goods to 
750 percent for luxury goods. In addition, more 
than 40 years of these protectionist policies 
caused the Chilean economy to be highly pro-
tected and dominated by a large and intrusive 
public sector. Through the use of controls on 
nominal interest rates and periodic negative 
real deposit rates, the financial sector was also 
severely restrained. (Corbo, p. 73) All of these 
factors led the Chilean economy to grow at a 
rate of less than one percent annually with 
inflation rates ranging from 30-40 percent. 
(Prendez, p. 84) 
By 1970 the economy was in shambles. Dr. 
Salvador Allende, a Marxist and a member of 
Chile's Socialist Party, was elected President by 
a narrow margin. In an effort to further nation-
alize most of the remaining private industries 
and banks, as well as U.S. interests in Chile's 
major copper mines, the economy grew worse. 
Within a short time, there was a major decline 
in domestic production, inflation rates exceed-
ed 1,000 percent per year, and the country saw 
shortages of consumer goods, food, and manu-
factured products. On September 11, 1973, 
unhappy with the deteriorating economy, 
General Augusto Pinochet successfully led a 
CIA-supported coup against the Chilean gov-
ernment. ("Background Notes: Chile, Oct 1998") 
Open Market Economy 
Under the Dictatorship 
After the coup in 1973, Chilean political 
policies were altered dramatically under 
General Pinochet's rule. Whereas the Chilean 
government had managed almost every aspect 
of the economy before the coup, several struc-
tural reforms were immediately initiated to 
reduce the power of the state. Through a strong 
privatization program, including that of the 
social security system, Chile succeeded in stim-
ulating private sector growth. The reforms also 
caused the protectionist policy of import sub-
stitution to be exchanged for a policy that 
favored a move towards an increase in exports 
and a reduction or elimination of tariff protec-
tion. While the rest of Latin America was gov-
erned under a protectionist policy, Chile was 
taking its first steps towards a move to a free-
trade foreign policy. (Ready, p. 38) 
In 1979 Chile abandoned many of the non-
tariff barriers associated with its previous strat-
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egy of import substitution, and decided to 
reduce tariffs to a flat 11 percent. In fact, Chile's 
trade reforms were 100 percent unilateral. By 
focusing on Chile's comparative advantages, 
labor, and natural resources, the reforms were 
implemented to bolster the efficiency and pro-
ductivity of Chile's economy. (Vicuna, p. 25) 
These policies appeared to be extremely suc-
cessful, and by the mid-1980s the Chilean econ-
omy started to grow at a sustained average rate 
of 6-8 percent of GDP per year. 
Trade Under a Democracy 
In 1988, after fifteen years of military rule, 
a plebiscite was held to determine if the coun-
try should continue under authoritarian rule 
or should choose a democratic political system. 
With over 53 percent of the votes, the Chilean 
people decided to replace their current form of 
government with a democracy. 
The democratic government brought 
about a considerable transformation in the 
Chilean economy; within a short time, the lev-
els of employment and wages both increased, 
while poverty was reduced throughout the 
country. In addition, Chile's foreign policy con-
tinued to further "open regionalism" with the 
other countries of Latin America as well as to 
begin trade negotiations with nations around 
the world. (Frohmann, "Chile's Emergence ... ," 
p. 8) The growth of Chile's foreign trade was 
enormous. In 1975, 200 companies in Chile 
exported 500 products to 50 countries. By 1989 
those numbers increased to 2,465 companies, 
1,478 products, and 121 countries; 1995 saw 
5,840 companies export 3,647 products to 167 
countries. Chile has succeeded in diversifying 
its trade in terms of both products and trading 
partners. Copper, which accounted for 80 per-
cent of Chile's exports in 1975, comprised less 
than 40 percent in 1995, and industrial prod-
ucts made up approximately 40 percent of 
Chile's exports, double their level from twenty 
years earlier. (Prendez, p. 85) Chile's strategy 
of opening its markets and expanding its inter-
national trade has been extremely successful, 
and it has been rewarded with over 15 years of 
sustained growth averaging 7 percent. In order 
to further open Chile's economy, in 1998 Chile's 
Senate approved a bill for an across-the-board 
tariff reduction from 11 percent to 6 percent. 
("Chile's Senate OKs Import Tariff Cut") 
Free-Trade Agreements 
Under a policy of "open regionalism, " 
Chile has sought to expand its markets on an 
international level, while seeking to diversify its 
foreign trade. The most efficient way to prevail 
in expanding a market on a global level is by 
signing free-trade agreements with a multitude 
of countries around the world. In fact, since 
1990, Chile has entered into over thirty free-
trade agreements (FTAs), an astounding num-
ber for an economy as small as Chile's. 
The advantages of a free-trade agreement 
are that it often can provide preferential mar-
ket access as well as an established set of trade 
rules and dispute-settlement mechanisms 
between two or more countries. (Vicuna, p. 26) 
This means that countries do not have to rely 
on their respective judicial systems, which may 
not provide the best results for both sides and 
which are not enforced in an international 
arena. As long as Chile can benefit from a given 
free-trade agreement, whether it is by an elim-
ination of tariffs or a mechanism to resolve dis-
putes, the Chilean government will consider the 
formulation of a free-trade agreement as a 
worthwhile venture. Regardless of the size of a 
free-trade agreement, as long as there is any 
form of benefit, Chile will negotiate for it. 
(Huepe, 1998) 
By examining the progression of Chile 's 
free-trade agreements over the past decade, it 
will be clear that Chile has established a posi-
tion within the global market that practically 
guarantees it access to a huge global market 
and stability of trade rules. 
Efforts for Further "Open 
Regionalism" 
In 1991 Chile negotiated a free-trade 
agreement with Mexico. This agreement has 
been an extremely successful venture for both 
countries, resulting in a seven-fold increase in 
trade between those two countries in less than 
seven years. (Portales) In fact, Chilean exports 
to Mexico are growing faster than exports to any 
other country. Therefore, in March 1998 Chile 
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and Mexico renegotiated their FTA to broaden 
their agreement and provide additional bene-
fits. In addition to Mexico, Chile has signed a 
multitude of other free-trade agreements with-
in Latin America, including Argentina, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Columbia, and Ecuador. 
("Background Notes: Chile, Oct 1998") 
In 1994, to expand its global trade Chile 
was accepted as a member of the Asian-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (APEC) , 
becoming only the third country within the 
Western Hemisphere -the other two are the 
United States and Mexico- to gain admission 
to APEC. In addition, in 1996 Chile and the 
European Union (EU) signed a framework 
cooperation agreement which should be nego-
tiated into a full free-trade agreement within 
the near future. 
MERCOSUR (1996) 
Just as NAFTA was established to increase 
the gains from trade among geographically 
related countries, the countries of Latin 
America, including Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Equador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, attempted to 
create a common market in their region since 
as early as 1960. This resulted in the creation 
of the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(ALALC). Then, in 1980 the same countries 
signed the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI) , which was established-
according to the Montevideo Treaty of 1980 -
"in order to proceed with the integration 
process of promoting the socioeconomic, har-
monious and balanced development of the 
region." ("Latin America") In 1991 Brazil, 
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay sought to 
change their relationship from free-trade part-
ners to members of a single economic union 
with a single external foreign trade policy. This 
Common Market of the South, called MERCO-
SUR, took the next step towards regional inte-
gration with the abolishment of internal tariffs 
on most products and the creation of a single 
external tariff, averaging 12-14 percent for 
eighty-five percent of products. The newly cre-
ated MERCOSUR region became Latin 
America's largest industrial base, with a foreign 
trade volume of over $75 billion and an inter-
nal trade volume of approximately $12 billion 
in 1994. (Ready, p. 28) 
In 1991 Chile's political leaders had to 
make a decision about becoming a member of 
MERCOSUR. The exposure and opportunities 
involved with MERCOSUR would be extremely 
advantageous for Chile's economy since Brazil 
and Argentina represented Chile's third and 
fourth largest trading partners, and almost 40 
percent of Chile's manufacturing goods were 
sold to its four member countries. However, a 
high price is associated with membership in 
MERCOSUR. Chile's external tariff was approx-
imately 11 percent, with MERCOSUR's resting 
a bit higher at about 14 percent. Chile had also 
recently decided to reduce its tariff to 6 percent. 
Therefore, if Chile wished to join, it would have 
to backtrack and tighten its economy by rais-
ing tariffs, which would be inconsistent with its 
foreign policy in the 1990s. Another stipulation 
of the MERCOSUR agreement is that its indi-
vidual members may not participate in free-
trade areas not negotiated by the trading bloc. 
This posed another problem for Chile since its 
foreign policy has been to negotiate for a mul-
titude of FTAs and it does not want its policies 
dictated by other countries. Clearly, it would 
not be in the best interest of the country if 
Chile's political leaders were to sign on with the 
other four MERCOSUR countries. (Portales) 
While it does not appear feasible for Chile 
to join MERCOSUR, the four countries in that 
trading bloc still represent a significant market 
for Chilean goods. Prior to the signing of MER-
COSUR, Chile had free-trade agreements with 
all four countries. However, regional relation-
ships - based purely on geography - are an 
important aspect of a foreign trade policy, and 
Chile did not want to abandon these markets. 
(Portales) Therefore, Chile negotiated with 
MERCOSUR to sign a free-trade agreement, 
resulting in Chile's becoming an associate 
member of MERCOSUR in 1996. The agree-
ment consisted of a phase-out tariff schedule, 
according to which all trade between MERCO-
SUR and Chile will be duty free by the year 
2014. (Arteaga, p. 37) 
With Chile's free-trade agreement with 
APEC - an FTA that MERCOSUR has not 
negotiated - Chile has become a bridge 
between the markets of Asia-Pacific and Latin 
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America. With Chile's unique circumstance of 
having market access to these two giant eco-
nomic regions, it is in a position that can be 
extremely beneficial and quite profitable. 
Canada (1996)- A Precursor to 
NAFTA 
Since Chile's return to democracy in the 
late 1980s, overall relations between Chile and 
Canada have been steadily improving. Trade 
between the two countries has also increased 
dramatically. Total trade between Canada and 
Chile has more than doubled from C$357 mil-
lion in 1992 to a high of C$760 million in 1996. 
In 1986 Canadian investment in Chile was only 
C$80 million, but in the following decade Canada 
became Chile's largest foreign investor during 
the years of 1990, 1992, and 1995. (Beaulieu) 
In fact, in December 1996 during Chilean 
President Frei's visit to Canada, the two coun-
tries signed a free-trade agreement, which 
became effective the next year. This FTA was 
an extremely important venture for both coun-
tries, as it covers trade in goods, services, and 
investments, and also includes dispute settle-
ment mechanisms. It provided for an immedi-
ate elimination of the 11 percent Chilean duty 
for the vast majority of Canadian industrial and 
resource-based exports, and called for an imme-
diate reduction of tariffs on other goods to 5.5 
percent, with a phase-out period of no more 
than five years. The agreement also ensured 
that investors from either country would be 
treated the same as domestic investors, and that 
Canadian investors would receive any benefits 
that Chile might grant to other countries in the 
future. Finally, the FTA prohibited Chile from 
increasing its current 30 percent reserve 
requirement on foreign credits and also limit-
ed those reserves to a maximum two-year peri-
od. ("Canada-Chile Trade ... ") 
The overall objective of the agreement also 
had a number of political overtones, reaching 
far beyond just creating a free-trade zone 
between two countries. The Canadian govern-
ment realized that it had a narrow window of 
opportunity where it could establish itself as the 
gateway between North and Latin America, since 
no FTA existed between the United States and 
Chile; however, the possibility of either Chile 
being included in NAFTA or the creation of an 
entire hemispherical FTA seems plausible in the 
near future. Since Chile had a free-trade agree-
ment with Canada but not with the U.S., Canada 
is in a position to have an advantage over the 
United States in terms of Chilean trade. Forcer-
tain products, Chile will be more likely to trade 
with Canada to benefit from the lower tariffs and 
more regulated trade rules. (Oak, 1998) 
Despite the gains of being the "gateway to 
Latin America," Canada had been a major sup-
porter of including Chile in the North American 
Free-Trade Agreement. In fact, one of the 
objectives of the FTA between the two countries 
was to show Canada's support for Chile's inclu-
sion into NAFTA. Therefore, the agreement was 
shaped to parallel NAFTA to ease Chile's path if 
and when Chile becomes a member of the FTA. 
During negotiations between Canada and Chile, 
though, the Chilean government could not 
agree upon a few important elements of the 
North American Free-Trade Agreement. Two 
such elements included were the sections on 
intellectual property rights (specifically on 
pharmaceuticals) and luxury taxes on automo-
biles. The biggest obstacle during negotiations 
was the insistence of the Chilean government 
on keeping its current one-year restriction on 
the repatriation of foreign investment. Canada 
accepted this condition, in the hopes that once 
Chile is eventually accepted into NAFTA this 
can be renegotiated. (Shapiro) 
In addition to the NAFTA-style free-trade 
agreement between Canada and Chile, in July 
1997 the two countries also signed an 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, as 
well as an Agreement on Labor Cooperation. 
These agreements were also signed to parallel 
the conditions involved with membership in 
NAFTA, in order to both continue to show sup-
port for Chile's inclusion into NAFTA, as well 
as to ease Chile's path once it is accepted into 
the agreement. 
However, while the free-trade agreement 
between Canada and Chile originally "started 
out as an exercise for NAFTA, [it] became an end 
in itself." (Frohmann, "Chile's Emergence ... ," 
p. 11) Since the Canada-Chile FTA became 
effective in July 1997, Canadian exports to Chile 
have increased 21 percent, and Chilean exports 
to Canada have increased by over 9 percent. 
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Canada currently holds the rank of the second 
largest investor in Chile, with over C$8 billion 
in foreign investment, as compared to only 
C$80 million a decade earlier. Joint ventures 
between the two countries have expanded 
tremendously; there are currently over 50 
Chile-Canada joint ventures operating in Chile, 
80 percent of which include some form of trans-
fer of technology from Canada to Chile. 
(Beaulieu) All indications show that the rela-
tionship between Chile and Canada will con-
tinue to prosper, as can be seen in the various 
agreements and memoranda of understanding 
that are continually being signed by Canada and 
Chile, covering topics such as political, eco-
nomic, and commercial relations, environ-
mental conditions, transportation issues, and 
exchanges of information and technology. 
Regardless of the achievements of the Canada-
Chile Free-Trade Agreement and its successive 
agreements, Canada still supports Chile's inclu-
sion into NAFTA and hopes that the FTA 
between the two countries can help if and when 
that time comes. 
Chilean Overtures to NAFTA 
"The Fourth Amigo" 
In 1990 President George Bush created 
the Enterprise of the Americas Initiative to ulti-
mately establish "a free-trade zone that would 
extend from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego." (Biggs, 
p. 17) In order to succeed in this venture, sev-
eral free-trade agreements would be created 
among the various regions of the Western 
Hemisphere, starting with the North American 
Free-Trade Agreement between the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico. After a series of 
negotiations, the presidents of the three coun-
tries signed the FTA in December 1992; and on 
January 1, 1994, NAFTA took effect. (Biggs, 
p. 17) The general objectives of NAFTA were to 
abolish barriers to trade and open up the 
telecommunications, textiles, automobiles, 
financial services, transportation, and energy 
markets. Also included in NAFTA are dispute 
resolution procedures, as well as provisions for 
labor and environmental issues. NAFTA was the 
first FTA ever to include such provisions. 
(Ready, p. 34) Since President's Bush initial 
announcement in 1990, Chile, due to the vast 
potential benefits of NAFTA, has consistently 
expressed an interest in becoming a part of 
either NAFTA or a similar FTA with the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico. In fact, at a White 
House dinner in May 1992, while NAFTA nego-
tiations were still in progress with Canada and 
Mexico, President Bush assured then-Chilean 
President Patricio Aylwin that as soon as nego-
tiations for NAFTA were concluded, the United 
States would welcome negotiations with Chile 
for a free-trade agreement. (Luxner) 
In December 1994 Chile's hopes of gain-
ing admission into NAFTA were further 
strengthened when President Clinton, at the 
Miami Summit of the Americas, formally invit-
ed Chile to begin negotiations to become the 
fourth member of NAFTA, earning Chile the 
nickname of "the Fourth Amigo." (Frohmann, 
1998) This invitation marked an important 
milestone in the relations between the United 
States and Chile. After all the hardships and 
setbacks that Chile faced during the dictator-
ship, this invitation indicated that Chile had 
achieved the required political and economic 
qualifications that the United States felt were 
important before any consideration would even 
be given to a country to join NAFTA. 
However, almost a decade after President 
Bush unveiled his Enterprise of the Americas 
Initiative, Chile has neither become a member 
of NAFTA nor signed an FTA with the United 
States. There is some disagreement within the 
United States about the resulting effects of 
Chile joining NAFTA, as well as political forces 
that are preventing this expansion. Regardless 
of the problems that currently block Chile's 
admission into the North American Free-Trade 
Agreement, Chile has gone on to sign FTAs with 
Canada and Mexico. Chile just awaits a time 
when an agreement with the United States 
could be solidified because of the potential ben-
efits that can be gained. To understand these 
benefits, though, it is first necessary to under-
stand the past and present relationship between 
Chile and the United States. 
The United States and Chile 
Relations between the United States and 
Chile are better now than ever before. However, 
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there have not always been favorable relations 
between these countries. At the start of dicta-
torship in 1973, the U.S. government support-
ed General Pinochet's military takeover of the 
Chilean government. This changed in 1976 
when a car bomb attack in Washington, D.C. 
killed Orlando Latelier, a former Chilean 
Ambassador and a U.S. citizen. This caused a 
great deal of animosity towards Chile, and 
resulted in a ban on security assistance and arms 
sales to Chile. For the remainder of Pinochet's 
military rule of Chile, relations between Chile 
and the United States were extremely strained. 
After Chile's return to democracy, though, 
Chilean President Alywin promised President 
Bush that the Chilean government would pur-
sue the Latelier assassination case. Shortly 
afterwards, the Chilean government proceeded 
to convict two Chilean military officers for 
ordering the assassination. This act marked a 
new era of relations between Chile and the 
United States, and President Bush immediately 
lifted the sanctions that were imposed on Chile. 
("Background Notes: Chile, Oct. 1998") 
With reestablished relations between Chile 
and the United States, increased trade between 
the two countries also emerged. Since 1993 
trade between the two countries has increased 
at an average rate of 13 percent per year. By 
1994 a quarter of Chile's trade was with the 
United States, compared to 27 percent with all 
of the other Latin American nations combined. 
U.S. imports from Chile- mainly copper and 
other minerals, as well as forest, paper and pulp 
products, wine, fish, and fruits and vegetables 
-totaled $2.3 billion in 1997, representing 
approximately 17 percent of all Chilean exports. 
In fact, Chile is now the second largest suppli-
er (after Mexico) of fruits and vegetable exports 
to the United States. U.S. exports headed to 
Chile, on the other hand, include machinery, 
computers, pharmaceuticals, telecommunica-
tions equipment, and vehicles. Total U.S. 
exports to Chile in 1997 were valued at $4.4 bil-
lion and accounted for 23 percent of Chile's 
imports, thus making the United States Chile's 
largest single supplier of foreign goods and the 
largest single market for Chilean goods. 
("Background Notes: Chile, Oct. 1998") The 
United States is also the largest supplier of for-
eign direct investment into Chile, with invest-
ments focusing mainly within the mining sec-
tor, but also in transportation, forestry, and 
telecommunications. (Ready, p. 39) 
Clearly, the United States is an extremely 
important market for Chile. Both countries are 
committed to expanding relations, and they 
have taken the first step by establishing four spe-
cial bilateral commissions, whose sole purpose 
is to examine and discuss issues on defense, 
global security, agriculture, and science. ("U.S.-
Chile Relations") While both governments rec-
ognize the many benefits of a free-trade agree-
ment - specifically NAFTA - they must also 
weigh them against any downside that may 
occur in an FTA between the two countries. 
Benefits of Chile's Accession into 
NAFTA 
With bilateral free-trade agreements 
already signed between Chile and Canada and 
between Chile and Mexico, the NAFTA member 
that would receive the largest benefit from 
Chile's accession into NAFTA would be the 
United States. Currently, every time Chile 
enters into a free-trade agreement with a coun-
try other than the United States - specifically 
those within the Western Hemisphere - a re-
ciprocal reduction of tariffs causes a boost in 
trade and investment with those countries, 
largely at the expense of U.S. companies. (Biggs, 
p. 19) From the American perspective, as Chile 
signs more FTAs with other countries, the expo-
sure of the United States within the Chilean 
economy drops as it becomes cheaper for Chile 
to trade with the other countries due to 
decreased tariffs. In fact, Washington State 
apple growers are losing a significant share of 
the Mexican market to Chilean growers during 
certain periods of the year. If not for Chile's 
advantage, U.S. growers would be able to export 
year round. ("Why Free Trade in the Americas?") 
With an FTA between the United States and 
Chile, the United States would be able to capi-
talize on the increase in U.S.-Chile joint ven-
tures and investments, similar to what Canada 
has experienced in the years since the signing 
of the Canada-Chile Free-Trade Agreement. 
From the Chilean perspective, there are 
two main reasons for its becoming a member 
of NAFTA, and thus creating a free-trade zone 
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with Mexico, Canada, and especially the United 
States. According to Alicia Frohmann in the 
Chilean Ministry of External Relations, an 
expert on NAFTA and free-trade agreements, 
the two main reasons for Chile to join NAFTA 
- or a similar FTA with the United States -
are to reduce the high tariffs imposed on 
Chilean exports in the United States and to form 
an official dispute settlement system for inter-
national trade. (Frohmann) 
Currently, one of the main disadvantages 
of exporting to the United States is the policy of 
tariff escalation, where the level of a tariff is 
determined by the value-added content of the 
good. This poses a tremendous problem for 
exporters of many finished goods because they 
have to pay extremely high tariffs. Admission 
into NAFTA would solve many of these problems 
for Chilean producers. In 1994 a special office 
was set up in Chile under the Confederation of 
Production and Trade- the top private organi-
zation covering all business - to prepare reports 
on how participation in NAFTA would affect 
Chile's production and service sectors. Six sep-
arate industries were analyzed to determine any 
benefits or detriments from increased trade lib-
eralization with the NAFTA nations. Agriculture, 
fishery products, timber, and mining were found 
to have a clear comparative advantage over their 
foreign competitors and would benefit from 
Chile's admission into NAFTA. Unfortunately, 
many of the agricultural advantages that Chile 
could capitalize on, specifically on wine, fruits, 
agribusiness products, and seed production, 
might come at the expense of several of Chile's 
traditional crops of wheat, corn, milk, and sugar. 
According to the reports, in the financial serv-
ices and banking sectors of the economy, "new 
institutions will open in a market that already 
has a number of international banks and that is 
competitive, well established, and well regulat-
ed." (Prendez, p. 88) Finally, it was inconclusive 
what effects the manufacturing sector would see 
because of the variety of products produced and 
sold both domestically and abroad. The reports 
did conclude, though, that the overall effects of 
Chile's ascension in NAFTA will only be positive 
if the large export market created by its entry 
will compensate for the flood of competitive 
imports that Chilean producers anticipate. 
(Prendez, pp. 88-89) 
The second main reason why the Chilean 
government wants to become a member of 
NAFTA is to form an official, formal system for 
dispute resolutions with the United States. In 
the international economy, Chile does not have 
a lot of leverage because of its small size. 
Therefore, when a dispute arises with another 
country with whom Chile does not have a dis-
pute settlement system, the disputes have to be 
solved through that country's judicial system. 
The implications of this can be disastrous, and 
Chile has already had to deal with this type of 
situation with the United States. For example, 
several U.S. salmon farmers have been accus-
ing Chile of unfairly dumping salmon into the 
U.S. markets and selling them below cost in 
order to stimulate demand for Chilean salmon 
and gain a significant market share. The 
Chilean salmon industry represents a $500 mil-
lion business on a global scale, with more than 
$ll1 million just in the United States, which is 
almost half of the U.S. salmon market. 
(Rushford) Since there is no formal agreement 
between the United States and Chile over dis-
pute resolutions, though, Chile is at the mercy 
of the American courts. Without an acceptable 
course of action or a set of formal proceedings, 
the odds of the situation being resolved in a 
mutually acceptable manner are greatly 
decreased. Therefore, signing an FTA with the 
United States or becoming the fourth member 
of NAFTA will give Chile its opportunity to 
defend itself properly and hopefully come to an 
acceptable resolution of this problem. 
Objections to Chile's Inclusion into 
NAFTA 
When President Clinton formally invited 
Chile to become the next member of NAFTA, it 
seemed as if Chile was going to get its wish. 
However, since 1995- and most recently dur-
ing a House of Representatives vote on 
September 25, 1998- the President of the 
United States has been denied fast-track nego-
tiating authority, leaving the United States 
without a working trade policy. (Sweeney) One 
reason that is often given for denying fast-track 
negotiating authority - and thus denying the 
possibility of Chile's admission into NAFTA-
is that its economy is not large enough to war-
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rant its inclusion into NAFTA. Chile is signifi-
cantly smaller than all of the NAFTA countries 
in terms of demographics, geography, and the 
economy. While the United States is Chile's 
largest trading partner, Chile ranks only 35th 
in total trade with the United States. However, 
the FTA would have more symbolic meaning 
because Chile would set an example for other 
Latin America countries to follow. This could 
lead to considerable future economic growth 
for Latin America. (Luxner) Another example 
of how Chile is important beyond its size is the 
fact that, although Chile was one of the largest 
per capita aid recipients in the 1970s, it has 
worked hard to reestablish itself within the 
global economy and has succeeded with fifteen 
years of stable growth. (Shapiro) Clearly, while 
the economic benefits may not be as great as 
some would prefer, the symbolic and political 
meaning behind Chile's accession into NAFTA 
would be great. 
Another argument that is used against the 
expansion of NAFTA is that when the free-trade 
zone is established, production facilities and 
jobs will be moved out of the high-cost U.S. 
economy and into the lower-skill, lower-wage 
Chilean economy. During the initial negotia-
tions for NAFTA between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico, there was great fear that 
many U.S. jobs would be relocated to Mexico 
where the cost of labor was much lower. 
Although there is no conclusive figure to deter-
mine the number of U.S. jobs that have relo-
cated to Mexico, the AFL-CIO estimates that 
300,000 to 400,000 American jobs have gone to 
Mexico since 1994. However, this number is not 
an accurate figure. First, many of the workers 
who lost their jobs immediately went on to new 
jobs or retirement. Also, the U.S.-Mexico 
Chamber of Commerce insists that 1.7 million 
export-related jobs have been created in the 
United States since 1993, largely because of 
NAFTA. ("NAFTA Is Serving ... ") Regardless of 
the actual number of jobs created or lost due to 
the signing of the North American Free-Trade 
Agreement, there are two important points that 
demonstrate why this is an irrelevant argument 
in regards to Chile. It may be true that many 
low-wage and low-skill jobs will emigrate from 
the U.S. economy as a result of increased glob-
al trade, which did happen with Mexico. But 
international trade is also responsible for cre-
ating new jobs, most of which will pay better 
than the jobs that were lost. ("NAFTA South") 
More importantly, though, the geographic dis-
tance of the United States and Chile is much 
greater than that between the United States and 
Mexico, who share a common border. In fact, 
for most goods, any saving from labor costs 
would be diminished by freight costs because 
of the distance between Chile and the United 
States. (Luxner) 
Finally, there is a great fear that once a 
free-trade agreement is signed between the 
United States and Chile, many industries- in 
both countries - that are currently under pro-
tectionist policies might be hurt once these 
policies are nullified by NAFTA. For example, 
Californian wine producers do not want Chilean 
wine, which is generally sold at a lower cost, to 
be allowed to enter the United States without 
having tariffs placed on it. On the other hand, 
though, Chilean farmers could be severely 
affected by the inflow of U.S. agricultural prod-
ucts. However, some of these arguments are 
severely overstated. As already mentioned, 
Chile has become the second largest supplier of 
fruits and vegetable exports to the United 
States. In fact, Chile sells approximately 40 per-
cent of its agricultural exports to the United 
States, but most of these products do not com-
pete with U.S. agriculture, mainly because of 
their different growing periods. (Ready, 
p. 38) In fact, U.S. grape suppliers and Chilean 
grape suppliers work in conjunction with one 
another, supplying grapes to their counterpart's 
country during half the year, while receiving 
grapes during the other half. Due to the dif-
fering growth seasons, U.S. and Chilean sup-
pliers can actually complement each other, 
instead of competing with each other. 
It is clear that there will be many sectors 
of the economy where the United States and 
Chile can work together to benefit both sides. 
Unfortunately, there will also be a great deal of 
short-term turmoil if a free-trade agreement is 
signed between the two countries because, for 
the first time, competitive imports from the 
other country may cause significant harm to 
the domestic industry. Traditional Chilean 
crops, such as wheat, corn, milk, and sugar, 
may not be able to compete with the United 
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States' producers of the same goods. In the 
long run, though, if a country can focus less on 
the products in which it is not competitive and 
more on the products in which it has a com-
parative advantage, it will have greater gains. 
Unfortunately, it is not easy for the farmer who 
can no longer compete against his foreign 
counterparts. With phase-out tariff schedules 
instead of an immediate elimination of the trade 
barriers, the short-term downfall should be 
somewhat controlled; and hopefully by the time 
that all barriers to trade are eliminated, those 
without the comparative advantages will have 
had plenty of time to better their positions with-
in the economy. 
Chile and NAFTA 
Since even before the adoption of the 
North American Free-Trade Agreement, Chile 
has been hoping, and partly expecting, that it 
would become the fourth member of NAFTA. 
However, negotiations between NAFTA and 
Chile never began because President Clinton 
was unable to secure fast-track negotiation 
approval from Congress. Without the chance 
of approval from the United States, Chile's 
hopes of becoming the fourth member of 
NAFTA were, at least temporarily, put on hold. 
Even without the benefits that NAFTA 
could have afforded Chile, the Chilean econo-
my has thrived over the past decade, having had 
stable growth rates with only modest inflation. 
But what will happen to the future of trade rela-
tions between the United States and Chile? 
According to President Clinton in an address to 
the Chilean National Congress on April 17, 
1998, "We [the United States] are your [Chile's] 
largest trading partner and trade between us 
has grown at an average of 13 percent a year 
since 1993. We want and will resolutely pursue 
a free-trade agreement that includes our two 
nations. And I will not be satisfied until we 
achieve that goal. Chile and the United States 
must be full partners in the 21st century." 
("Transcript: Bill Clinton ... ") Although talks 
for NAFTA- or a separate bilateral trade agree-
ment between the United States and Chile-
are not currently feasible, President Clinton and 
Chilean President Frei agreed at the Summit of 
the Americas in Santiago, Chile, in 1998 to set 
up a commission in order to encourage invest-
ment and commerce between the countries, as 
well as to resolve disputes. (Baker) Unfor-
tunately, the core problem still exists that the 
United States and Chile will be unable to nego-
tiate for a free-trade agreement in the short run. 
While Chileans are extremely excited about 
their growing economy and continued trade 
with the United States even without NAFTA, 
they still want to see a free-trade agreement 
between the two countries. Therefore, both 
Chile and the United States have to look 
towards other alternatives for the future of 
trade between their two nations. 
Free-Trade Area of the Americas 
When President Clinton formally invited 
Chile to become the "Fourth Amigo" of NAFTA 
at the Miami Summit of the Americas in 1994, 
he also proposed to expand on President Bush's 
concept of a "free-trade zone that would extend 
from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego." (Biggs, p. 17) 
President Clinton presented the idea of a Free-
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that would 
include all 34 countries within the Western 
Hemisphere, except Cuba, and eliminate barri-
ers to trade and investment on a hemispheric 
scale. There are three main principles that the 
FTAA should accomplish. First, through eco-
nomic integration and increased free-trade, it 
will promote prosperity throughout the entire 
region. Also, it will work to abolish poverty and 
discrimination throughout the hemisphere. 
Finally, environmental problems will be 
addressed to conserve the natural resources and 
environment for future generations. (Thomas, 
p. 67) The Miami Summit set the framework 
for future negotiations among the 34 countries 
that will be involved, and set 2005 as the latest 
date to conclude FTAA negotiations. 
The proposed Free-Trade Area of the 
Americas, if successful, would create the largest 
free-trade zone in the world and would comprise 
850 million people and a $13 trillion economy. 
Ultimately, the agreement will cover an exten-
sive array of issues that include "tariffs, non-tar-
iff barriers in goods and services, agriculture, 
subsidiaries, investment, intellectual property 
rights, government procurement, product stan-
dards, rules of origin, anti-dumping and coun-
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tervailing duties, sanitary and phytosanitary pro-
cedures, dispute settlement, and competition 
policy." (Lang) Once negotiated and agreed 
upon, though, all 34 countries will be bound by 
one set of trade practices and policies, thereby 
superseding a large number of trade pacts 
already in place. It would also succeed in bring-
ing the United States and Chile together in an 
extensive free-trade zone with NAFTA-type 
results. In fact, the Chilean government real-
izes that with the proposed FTAA underway it 
needs to move beyond NAFTA and focus on suc-
cessfully negotiating the Free-Trade Area of the 
Americas. (Frohmann) 
Unfortunately, without fast-track negoti-
ating authority, the United States will be unable 
to lead or fully participate in the FTAA negoti-
ations, just as President Clinton lacked the 
authority to negotiate for an expansion of 
NAFTA. Fortunately, most of the preliminary 
work that needs to be done in order to set up 
the FTAA does not require the United States to 
have fast-track. Therefore, not having fast-track 
authority hasn't had any negative effects on the 
current round of negotiations, but it will be 
needed later in the process. (Rosenberg) 
Therefore, as long as the U.S. President can gain 
such authority before the proposed start of 
FTAA, this should not be a major concern. 
However, there are many obstacles and dis-
agreements that need to be overcome before the 
Free-Trade Area of the Americas negotiations can 
be completed. First, many countries currently 
have domestic industries that have many protec-
tionist policies in place. Opening up the hemi-
sphere in such a large scale could have severe 
effects on those sectors of the economy. Also, the 
34 separate countries all have varying economic 
conditions, as well as different laws pertaining to 
labor and the environment. ("Emerging Trade 
Agreements") Since many of the Latin American 
countries have small economies, some signifi-
cantly smaller than many U.S. states, there may 
need to be some provisions within the agreement 
to protect these small countries. This is likely to 
cause a lot of turmoil during negotiations 
because the resulting agreement has to set the 
standards for all 34 countries and has to be fol-
lowed uniformly. 
The largest obstacle that needs to be 
addressed is that of determining the path by 
which the Free-Trade Area of the Americas will 
eventually be reached. One proposed solution 
that the United States has favored is to bring 
each Latin America country under the NAFTA 
umbrella one at a time, thereby gaining the 
advantage of a uniform set of rules and tested 
procedures. This would also give the United 
States firm control over the implementation of 
the FTAA. Another alternative would be to 
form a multitude of regional agreements, like 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR, and then negotiate 
links between them. Whether one of these 
solutions is chosen or another one, this is 
going to be a major issue to negotiate. Of 
course, if the president of the United States is 
not given fast-track authority in the near 
future, all of the negotiations will have been 
pointless. (Thomas, pp. 67 -68) 
Conclusion 
The future of trade relations in the world 
is continuously changing. New free-trade 
agreements are being negotiated and signed. 
Historically, most FTAs involved a small num-
ber of trading partners - usually two - and 
set specific rules of trade. Over the past few 
years, large trading blocs have begun to emerge 
and often include provisions for more than just 
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the trading of goods. MERCOSUR was estab-
lished as a regionally integrated market with a 
single external foreign policy and interwoven 
economies. Before NAFTA was negotiated, no 
free-trade agreement had included extensive 
provisions on labor and the environment. And 
currently, the proposed Free-Trade Area of the 
Americas would link an entire hemisphere 
together under one single free-trade zone. 
If the Free-Trade Area of the Americas 
eventually becomes a reality, it will be a major 
stepping-stone to increased international trade. 
Nobody knows where the FTAA will lead the 
Western Hemisphere - or the world - and 
how it will ultimately affect international trade. 
However, as far as Chile is concerned, the Free-
Trade Area of the Americas is the direction that 
it wants to go. In keeping with its policy of 
"open regionalism" and increased trade, the 
FTAA will provide a broader array of benefits 
and opportunities within an extremely large 
economy. In fact, Chile already has some form 
of negotiated agreement with a majority of the 
countries that would be included in the FTAA. 
And for the countries with which Chile does not 
currently have free-trade agreements, especial-
ly the United States, this offers them a chance 
to enter into even more markets. 
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